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In usual security proofs of quantum protocols the adversary (Eve) is expected to have full control
over any quantum communication between any communicating parties (Alice and Bob). Eve is
also expected to have full access to an authenticated classical channel between Alice and Bob.
Unconditional security against any attack by Eve can be proved even in the realistic setting of
device and channel imperfection. In this Letter we show that the security of QKD protocols is
ruined if one allows Eve to possess a very limited access to the random sources used by Alice. Such
knowledge should always be expected in realistic experimental conditions via different side channels.
Introduction — The emergence of quantum theory in
the early twentieth century led to a revolution in many
areas of physics. One of its main features was the in-
troduction of intrinsic randomness, originating from the
very nature of the theory. This probabilistic nature led
to questioning of concepts of (macro)realism and local-
ity [1] which was considered as an unwanted consequence
of quantum theory. True randomness, much unwanted
from the point of view of classical physics, serves as a
valuable resource in many cryptographic protocols. It is
for this reason that quantum random number generators
(QRNG) were one of the first commercially available de-
vices utilizing basic principles of quantum physics in its
elementary nature.
Towards the latter part of the twentieth century it
was recognized that quantum mechanics could lead an-
other revolution and dramatically extend the premise
of information processing. Classical notions of security
underpinned by computational conditions were seriously
threatened by the edicts of quantum mechanics and by
the emergence of Shor’s algorithm [2]. However, quan-
tum mechanics offered a new security paradigm whereby
the use of quantum states imparted unconditional secure
communication through quantum key distribution (QKD)
[3]. Quantum key distribution protocols enable two com-
municating parties to produce a shared random secret
key in such a way that also reveals the presence of any
third party. The secret key can be used later to imple-
ment an unconditionally secure encryption protocol [4].
The security of QKD has been established not only for
an ideal noiseless experimental setting, but it has also
been proven robust within more realistic settings to the
extent that QKD systems are now commercially avail-
able [5]. Interestingly, the robustness of QKD protocols
has only been proven with respect to possible attacks on
quantum data exchanged by the communicating parties
with the assumption that a third party possesses knowl-
edge of all exchanged classical data.
Sources of classical random bits, repeatedly used dur-
ing different phases of quantum protocols, were silently
considered being perfect. An unstated assumption in the
standard proofs of security [6–8] is that the source of ran-
dom bits used in the protocol is unbiased and completely
unaccessible to the adversary. Unfortunately, however,
perfect or unbiased randomness is very difficult to obtain
in practice. All classical sources of random bits provide in
fact only pseudorandom bit strings, which might be fully
accessible to the adversary together with knowledge of its
preparation procedure and input bits. Specialized QRNG
devices only produce biased randomness and require clas-
sical post processing [9], something one has to consider as
accessible to the adversary. Real world random number
generators inevitably leak information via side channels
and, thus, may be vulnerable to outside conditions (e. g.,
temperature, input power, EM radiation etc.) which are
potentially controlled by the adversary.
Although the problem of weak (biased) randomness
has been broadly studied and is relatively well under-
stood in classical information processing [10–13], there
has not been a similar analysis of its quantum counter-
part. This may be due to the fact that there theoretically
exists a perfect source of randomness in quantum world
and any weaknesses are only attributed to imperfect im-
plementation. Recent investigations however show that
quantum information processing can help to increase se-
curity of communication using weak randomness even for
regions of parameters where purely classical processing
would inevitably reveal all information to the adversary
[14, 15].
In this Letter we will examine the security setting of
QKD in which the adversary, aside from having a full
control of the quantum and classical channel, has also
some limited control over the sources of randomness the
communicating parties employ during the protocol (Fig.
1). We will show that with an increasing key length, only
a negligible control of the randomness is necessary to ren-
der the QKD insecure. In particular, we will demonstrate
that the secret key individually held by communicating
parties will differ significantly. Moreover, knowledge
pertaining to the secret key held by the adversary will
be comparable to the knowledge held by the receiving
party.
Weak sources — Random processes are usually de-
scribed by their probability distributions. However, it
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2FIG. 1: A sketch version of the BB84 protocol. Eve has full
access to both quantum channel (Q.C.) and to authenticated
classical channel (A.C.C.), and possesses a partial access to
random sources of Alice and Bob.
is insufficient to model a weak random source by a single
probability distribution because the bias of the source is
typically unknown. The only information usually known
about the source is that it is random to a certain extent;
thus, we allow the output of the weak random source
to be distributed according to any probability distribu-
tion containing sufficient randomness. We will quan-
tify the amount of randomness of a distribution by the
min–entropy of its source. The min–entropy of the ran-
dom variable X is defined by
H∞(X) = min
x∈X
(− log2 Pr (X = x)) . (1)
A non–uniform source of randomness is an (N, b)-source
if it emits N -bit strings drawn according to a probability
distribution with a min-entropy of at least b bits. Thus,
every specific N -bit sequence is drawn with probability
smaller or equal to 2−b. For b = N , one obtains a perfect
source where all sequences are drawn with the same prob-
ability. The bias of the source can be easily quantified by
the min-entropy loss denoted c = N−b. A distribution is
(N, b)–flat if it is an (N, b)–source and it is uniform on a
subset of 2b sample points, i. e., each string is outputted
with a probability of either zero or 2−b.
The quantity bN is called the min–entropy rate and it
achieves unity for perfect random sources that deliver one
bit of entropy per bit produced. We will be particularly
interested in the min–entropy loss rate which will be de-
noted by quantity cN . This quantity is (almost) zero for
(almost) perfect random sources and approaches unity as
the quality of the source decreases.
The QKD protocol — Here we demonstrate the attack
using a variation of the well-known BB84 protocol [3]
which serves as a representative for the prepare-measure
family of protocols.
Distribution phase: Using a random number generator
Alice produces a 2n–bit string X. Then depending on a
2n–bit string from a random variable Y , Alice encodes
each bit into a qubit from one of four possible states
{|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}. The state of the ith-qubit is condi-
tioned on the ith-bits of both X and Y . In particular,
each bit of X with value 0 is encoded into either |0〉 or
|+〉 depending on whether the corresponding bit of Y is
0 or 1 respectively. A similar case holds for the bit 1
encoding into the states |1〉 and |−〉. Alice subsequently
transmits all 2n–qubits to Bob. In order to obtain in-
formation about the 2n–bit string X, an adversary will
be compelled to interact with these transmitted qubits
which inevitably leads to a disturbance in the transmit-
ted sequences.
Sifting phase: Bob measures each received qubit to
obtain a 2n–bit string. Similar to the encoding proce-
dure, a set of measurement bases are chosen according
to a uniformly distributed random variable Z that out-
puts a 2n–bit string. If the ith–bit of Z has value 0,
Bob measures in the computational basis otherwise Bob
measures in the diagonal basis. The sequence of mea-
surement bases is revealed by Bob whereupon Alice then
announces the locations of those qubits for which the
corresponding preparation and measurement bases do no
coincide. After discarding these qubits, Alice and Bob
possess on average n–bit strings XA and XB . Following
the sifting phase, the adversary has an estimate XE of
Alice’s string XA that depends on the degree to which
the adversary interacted with the transmitted qubits. If
there is no interaction then the adversary possesses no in-
formation on the n–bit string XA. In the case of faultless
quantum communication, XA and XB will be identical.
However, in the case of the adversary choosing to inter-
act with many qubits, the estimate XE will be a good
approximation to XA, and this causes XB to differ sig-
nificantly from XA.
Parameter estimation: The primary aim of parameter
estimation is to approximate the number of errors be-
tween the n–bit strings XA and XB . The source of the
errors may be attributed to a combination of quantum
channel imperfections or eavesdropping by the adversary.
However, in security proofs, one always considers the
worst case scenario and, thus, assumes the adversary to
be responsible for all errors.
Random sampling provides a way to estimate the num-
ber of errors between XA and XB . According to the out-
put from a random variable T , Alice chooses a set of bit
positions of XA and assigns these as the test positions.
Alice and Bob reveal the bit value in each test position.
The number of errors t provides a reasonable estimate r
on the actual number of errors in the remaining bits of
XRA and X
R
B [7]. If the number of errors in the test po-
sitions is excessive then there is a high probability that
the adversary is present and the protocol is aborted.
3In any practical application one wants the test set to
be relatively small in order to achieve a maximal possible
key length. In existing QKD protocols, the size of the
test set is typically in order of
√
n or log(n) [16–18]. In
the following asymptotic analysis, we assume the most
general case and post only a condition that the size of
the test set is sublinear in n. In particular, we assume it
is equal to Θ(n1−α) with 0 < α < 1.
Information reconciliation and privacy amplification:
Following parameter estimation, the bit strings XRA and
XRB contain with a high probability up to r errors. The
goal of the information reconciliation is to remove these
errors even at the cost of revealing some information
about XRA and X
R
B . This task is usually realized by one–
way communication [7, 8, 18]. Such one way informa-
tion reconciliation can be implemented as long as Bob
has more information than the adversary about Alice’s
string XRA [19].
The goal of the privacy amplification is to remove any
knowledge possessed by Eve about the shared string XRA .
A widely used method [20, 21] is based on the random
choice of a hashing function. In this case, Alice randomly
chooses a hashing function f and sends it to Bob. The
final shared key is f(XRA ) = f(X
R
B ). Importantly, this
method also uses one–way communication.
The Adversary’s attack — The use of uniform ran-
domness is widespread throughout the various steps of
the QKD protocol. The first instance of uniform ran-
domness occurs during the distribution phase when Al-
ice chooses 2n–bit strings X and Y uniformly. During
the sifting phase of the protocol, Bob must decide on a
set of measurement bases which is again dependent upon
a uniformly distributed random variable that outputs a
2n–bit string. In the parameter estimation phase, a sub-
set of the strings is chosen as a test set according to a
uniformly distributed random variable T and, again, an-
other source of random bits is used to select the hashing
function. In light of these cases, we will investigate a
scenario in which Alice’s randomness source - used to se-
lect the positions of test qubits - is biased. Similar to
the case of faulty quantum channels we will consider the
worst case scenario and attribute all randomness imper-
fections to the adversary. This can be modelled by a
scenario whereby the adversary can influence the distri-
bution of the random variable T to such an extent that
the adversary is allowed to set any (n, n−c)–distribution
to the random variable T with c denoting the strength of
the adversary’s attack. We assume that c is large enough
to guarantee the adversary that at least half of the qubits
will not be tested. Later we calculate the required value
of c.
Without the loss of generality, let us suppose that the
first half of Bob’s measurement outcomes will not be
tested. The adversary can measure the first half of the
2n-qubits in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis. If Eve’s measurement
outcome is |0〉, she sends a state |1〉 to Bob and if her
measurement outcome is |1〉, she sends a state |0〉. Fol-
lowing this procedure and the sifting phase, the adversary
has on average n2 measurement outcomes. The adver-
sary adds another n2 bits chosen randomly and uniformly
to obtain her estimate XE of Alice’s string XA. Since
Alice and Bob have not tested those bits measured by
the adversary, the protocol will continue on to remaining
phases.
We now quantify the amount of information that Bob
and the adversary possess about Alice’s n–bit string XA.
To obtain the result, we calculate the Hamming distance
H(A,B) between strings A and B. There are three cases
to consider. Firstly, the adversary may have measured
a transmitted qubit in the correct basis. In such a case,
the adversary obtains a bit value that coincides with the
corresponding bit value in XA with Bob then obtaining
the bit complement. This happens on average in n/4
measurement cases. Secondly, it may happen that the
adversary measures a transmitted qubit in incorrect ba-
sis. Here both Bob and the adversary obtain the correct
value with probability 1/2. This happens on average in
n/4 bits. The final situation to consider is the case in
which the adversary does not perform a particular qubit
measurement. The adversary then chooses random val-
ues for these bit positions and correctly guesses the value
with probability 1/2. In this situation, Bob’s measure-
ment value is due to measuring in the correct basis and,
thus, he determines the value of Alice’s bit with certainty.
This last situation occurs in n/2 of the bits.
The amount of information that Bob and the adversary
possess about Alice’s string XA is given by H(XB , XA)
and H(XE , XA) respectively. Both of these quantities
are on average equal to 5n/8. Consequently, the adver-
sary and Bob possess on average the same level of knowl-
edge about Alice’s string. As the subsequent steps of the
protocol demand that only Alice communicates informa-
tion, it follows that with the conclusion of the protocol,
the adversary and Bob continue to share the same level
of information about Alice’s bit sting. This illustrates
that ultimately there can be no privacy between Alice
and Bob.
The strength of the Adversary — It remains to quantify
how much information in terms of min–entropy loss the
adversary requires in order to prevent parameter estima-
tion on half of the bit positions. Alice needs log
(
n
n1−α
)
bits to specify n1−α positions out of n. On the other
hand, the adversary wants Alice to choose the n1−α test
bits only from n2 of the positions. Apparently, the best
option for the adversary - in terms of the smallest en-
tropy loss - is to set any
(
log
(
n
n1−α
)
, log
( n/2
n1−α
))
-flat dis-
tribution to Alice’s random number generator. Such a
distribution would uniformly select test bits only within
the pre-selected half of all positions.
Of particular importance here will be an analysis of
the relative behavior of two quantities; the first quantity
4is the length of the test bit string
N = log
(
n
n1−α
)
,
and the second quantity is the min–entropy loss
c = log
(
n
n1−α
)
− log
(
n/2
n1−α
)
.
Both of these quantities diverge since Alice demands
an increased level of randomness to choose the test bits
from an ever increasing set size. Now, the min–entropy
loss rate c/N expresses the amount of total randomness
required to restrict all possible test bit positions within a
prescribed subset of the total bit set. We will show that
the rate c/N , which is given as
c
N
=
log
(
n
n1−α
)− log ( n/2
n1−α
)
log
(
n
n1−α
) , (2)
remains finite.
We will consider this expression in the limit of large
n as all current security proofs for various QKD proto-
cols have only been proven in the asymptotic regime of
infinite key length. In evaluating the min–entropy loss
rate c/N in the limit of large n, we will make use of the
Stirling approximation of the factorial function log (n!) =
(n+ 1/2) log (n)− n. Furthermore, we can approximate
the quantity c as n1−α log (2)+O (log (n)) while the quan-
tity N can the approximated to n1−α log (n) +O
(
n1−α
)
.
The min–entropy loss rate c/N in the limit of large n can
be evaluated to
c
N
≈ 1
log (n)
. (3)
Under the assumption of perfect randomness, all QKD
protocols have been proven to be perfectly secure in the
limit of an infinitely large key size. However, implement-
ing perfect randomness is difficult. By relaxing the as-
sumption of perfect randomness to reflect real life con-
ditions, Eq. (3) illustrates that QKD no longer remains
robust. In particular, a negligible control on the source
of randomness renders QKD insecure.
Entanglement based protocols — In these protocols
[6, 22], parties share entangled pairs of photons and em-
ploy monogamy of entanglement to build up security. A
portion of these states are used to check the monogamy
- and, thus, exclude the presence of an adversary - while
the remaining states are used to perform the protocol
itself. The test pairs are selected by a random source
exactly in the same way as in the prepare-measure based
protocols. Having access to the random source of the se-
lecting party, Eve might easily perform an attack where
she could entangle herself to pairs not being tested in the
future and, thereby, obtain information about the secret
key.
Conclusion — In this Letter we demonstrated that if
one allows an adversary a limited access to the random
sources used by the communicating parties then the se-
curity of QKD protocols is be completely compromised.
This is the case for almost all known QKD protocols that
use part of the data set to test for an adversary. In such
instances, the adversary is able to restrict the test sample
efficiently. The obvious defence against such an attack is
to increase the number of test states to a significant linear
portion of the raw key. This would, however, profoundly
decrease the length of the secret key.
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